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In the field of noncooperative game the Nash equilibrium point (NEP) is widely
known as a concept of solution (Nash [7]), This is a point at which all players maintain
the balance by aiming to maximize his own expected payoff (the individual rationality).
But the NEP has two problems as follows:
(1) When a NEP doesn’t satisfy the social efficiency (the Pareto optimality) , it
happens often that a player selects various strategies except the Nash
equilibrium strategy (NES). For example , in the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG)
the NEP is (silence , silence) , which doesn’t satisfy the Pareto optimality 2 but
Minas et al. [5] shows that in many experiments of the PDG the 43% subjects
take the strategy “confession”.
(2) When there are many NESs , since a player can’t distinguish a NEP which he
should follow , NEPs can’t become a suitable guidance for selecting a strategy.
As a method for getting rid of the gap between a NEP and social efficiency , the
metagame analysis is known , which considers the selection of strategy to be a result of
multistage thinking (Howard [3]). We call a response function to an opponent player in
the original game by a metagame strategy. We can consider a new game in which its
pure strategy is a metagame strategy in the original game. The new game is called a
metagame of the original game. Moreover we can consider a new metagame for the
above-mentioned metagame and then an infinite tree of metagames can be formed. The
result of the original game determined from the NEP of a metagame on any step in the
tree is called a metagame equilibrium of the original game. We can often obtain a
metagame equilibrium satisfying the Pareto optimality. In such a case we can get rid of
the gap between the individual optimality and the social one. It is known that a
necessary and sufficient condition for a result of the original game to be a metagame
equilibrium is that if any player intends to deviate from the result , another player can
punish him (Howard [4]). But if the payoff of the punishing player is smaller than the
payoff before the punishment , the punishment is not efficient. In the metagame
analysis we don’t demand the efficiency of punishment,
The conflict analysis improves the metagame analysis at the following two points:
$(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{W}\mathrm{e}$ demand strictly the condition that a punishment is efficient.
$(\ddot{\mathrm{n}})\mathrm{W}\mathrm{e}$ allow simultaneous changes of strategies by many players.
In the next section the conflict analysis is explained and a stable equilibrium point
(SEP) is defined, The SEP is a point from which any group of players doesn’t intend to
deviate (Fraser et al. $[1],[2]$). It is known that a SEP is a metagame equilibrium. But if
there are many SEPs, they can’t also become a suitable guidance for selecting a
strategy.
In this paper we consider the attitude of each player for the conflict situation as a
motive for selecting a strategy and consider several motives. The prediction by a certain
player $\mathrm{P}$ for a motive of each player is represented by his motive distribution. We
calculate a probability for each SEP to realize and distinguish SEPs each other by a
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realization probability. We propose that player $\mathrm{P}$ should use a strategy indicated by the
SEP having the maximum realization probability.
In Section 2 the conflict analysis and a stable equilibrium point are explained. In
Section 3 we propose a method of calculating a realization probability of each SEP by
motive distributions. In Section 4 we give a numerical example.
2. ConflictAnalysis and Stable Equilibrium
In this section we explain the conflict analysis and a stable equilibrium point (SEP).
We consider a situation in which $\mathrm{n}$ players are involved with a conflict. Let $N$ be
the set of players , namely , $N=\{1,\ldots$ , $n\}$ . An atomic alternative which can be selected
by a player is called his option. Let $O_{i}$ be the set of options for player $\mathrm{i}$ . Furthermore
we put $O=\{O_{1},\ldots$ , $O_{n}\}$ . A feasible subset of the set $O_{i}$ that is a feasible
combination of several options for player $\mathrm{i}$ is called a strategy of player $\mathrm{i}$ . Let $7_{i}$ be
the set of strategy of player $\mathrm{i}$ . We put $T=\{T_{1},\ldots, T_{\hslash}\}$ . A feasible combination of
strategies selected by all players is called a result for the situation of decision making.
Let $U$ be the set of results. Then any $u(\in U)$ can be represented by $u=\{u_{1},\ldots,u_{n}\}$
where $u_{\mathrm{i}}\in T_{i}(\mathrm{i}=1,\ldots,n)$ . Paying attention to a specific subset $S(\subseteq N)$ we may
write $u=\{u_{s}$ , $u_{-s}\}$ where $u_{s}=\{u_{\dot{2}}\}_{i\in S}$ and $u_{-s}=\{u_{\dot{f}}\}_{i\in N\backslash S}$ . Let $U_{s}(U_{-s})$ be the set of
$u_{s}(u_{-s})$ .
We consider a preference relation $R_{1}$ on the set $U$ by player $\mathrm{i}$ . That is to say , for
any two results $u$ $u^{\mathfrak{l}}(\in U)$ , the relation $uR_{?}u$ ’implies that player 7 prefers the
result $u$ more than or equal to the result $u’$ . When the preference relation of player $i$
depends on his payoff , letting $p_{\mathrm{i}}(u)$ be the payoff of player $\mathrm{i}$ from the result $u$ , the
relation $uR_{t}u^{1}$ implies $p_{i}(u)\geq p_{\mathrm{i}}$ $(u |\backslash )$ . We put $R= \{\prod$ , $\ldots$ , $R_{n}\}$ .
Definition 1. A conflict situation means a tuple $(\mathrm{N},\mathrm{O},\mathrm{T},\mathrm{U},\mathrm{R})$ .
Definition 2. We consider any subset $S(\subseteq N)$ and any result $u=(u_{s},$ $u_{-s})\subseteq U$ .
For any $u_{s}^{\mathrm{t}}\in U_{s}$ , we call ($u_{\acute{s}}$ , $u_{-s}$ ) the movement from the result $u$ by the subset $S$ .
Let $M_{s}(u)$ be the set of movements.
$M_{s}(u)=\{(u_{s}^{\iota},u_{-s})\in U|u_{s}^{l}\in U_{s}\}$ . (1)
Let $m_{s}^{+}(u)$ be the set of results which guarantee more payoff than the result $u$ to
all players in the subset $S$ , that is ,
$m_{s}^{+}(u)=\{u^{1}\in U|p_{i}(u)<p_{i}(u’)$ for any $\mathrm{i}\in S\}$ . (2)
Let $m_{s}^{-}(u)$ be the set of results which can’t guarantee more payoff than the result $u$
to at least one player in $S$ , that is ,
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$m_{s}^{-}(u)=\{u^{t}\in U|p_{\mathrm{i}}(u’)\leq p_{i}(u)$ for some $\mathrm{i}\in S\}$ . (3)
Definition 3. If amovement from aresult $u(\in U)$ by asubset $S(\subseteq N)$
guarantees more payoff than the result $u$ to all players in $S$ , then the movement is
called an improvement from the result $u$ by the subset $S$ . Let $M_{s}^{+}(u)$ be the set of
improvements from $u$ by $S$ , that is,
$M_{s}^{+}(u)=M_{s}(u)\cap m_{s}^{+}(u)$ . (4)
Definition 4. When an improvement $u’(\in M_{s}^{+}(u))$ is given 7 if there exists an
improvement $u^{1\prime}(\in M_{s}^{+}|(u‘))$ from $u^{\mathrm{I}}$ by another subset $S$
’
$(\neq S)$ , which gives at
least one player in $S$ a payoff less than or equal to a payoff from the result $u$ , we call
$u^{\mathrm{b}}$ apunishment for $u^{1}$ by $S^{t}$ . Let $\overline{M}_{s,s}$ . $(u,u^{l})$ be the set ofpunishments, that is,
$\overline{M}_{s.s}$ . ( $u$ , $u^{\mathfrak{l}})=M_{s^{1}}^{+}(u^{t})\cap m_{s}^{-}(u)$ . (5)
Definition 5. Aresult $u(\in U)$ is a stable equilibrium point (SEP) if and only if either
of the following two conditions is satisfied :
(1) There is no improvement from the result $u$ by any subset $S(\subseteq N)$ , that is ,
$M_{s}^{+}(u)=\phi$ for any $S(\subseteq N)$ . (6)
(2) Even if there is an improvement $u^{\mathrm{I}}$ from the result $u$ by the subset $S(\subseteq N)$
there exists a punishment for $u^{\mathfrak{l}}$ by some subset $S’(\neq S)$ , that is ,
$\overline{M}_{s,s}$ ’ $(u,n^{1})\neq\phi$ for some $S^{1}(\subseteq N)$ . (7)
All players are balanced at a SEP since any group of players has no incentive to
deviate from the SEP
3. Distinction among Stable Equilibria
When there are many SEPs , a player is at a loss which to aim. In this section we
consider a distinction among stable equilibria from a viewpoint.of a possibility of
occurrence of each SEP. Several motives for selecting a strategy are considered. We
represent the uncertainty for a motive of a player by a motive distribution , and obtain a
probability for each SEP to realize. We consider that a player should follow the SEP
having the maximum realization probability.
Let $G$ be the original game $l$
$G=[a_{t}$ $(j_{1},\ldots,j_{n})|j_{k}\in T_{k}(k=1, \ldots,n),\mathrm{i}=1,\ldots,n]$ (8)
where $a_{\mathrm{i}}(j_{1},\ldots,j_{n})$ is apayoff ofplayer $\mathrm{i}$ given that player 1, . .. , $n$ use pure
strategies $j_{1},\ldots$ , $j_{n}$ respectively. We consider 1 motives $m_{1},\ldots$ , $m_{l}$ for a player to
select a strategy and put $M=\{m_{1}$ , ..., $m_{l}\}$ . Let $a_{i}^{k}$ $(j_{1},\ldots,j_{n})$ be a payoff of player $\mathrm{i}$
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following a motive $m_{k}$ , which can be represented by the original game $G$ , for
example ,
$m_{1}$ : maximization of his own payoff (selfish motive)
$a_{i}^{1}$ ( $j_{1},\ldots$ , $j_{n})=a_{i}(j_{1}$ , ..., $j_{n}) arrow\max_{l_{i}}$ (9)
$m_{2}$ : maximization of the social payoff , that is , the expected payoff of all
players (coexistence motive)
$a_{f}^{2}$ ( $j_{1},\ldots$ , $j_{n})= \frac{1}{n}\sum_{j=1}^{n}a_{j}(j_{1},\ldots,$ $j_{n}) arrow\max_{j_{I}}$ (10)
$m_{3}$ : maximization of the expected payoff in the group $S(\subseteq N)$
$a_{i}^{3}$
$(j_{1}, \ldots, j_{n})=\frac{1}{||S||}\sum_{j\in S}a_{J}(j_{1},\ldots, j_{n})arrow \mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}j_{\mathrm{i}}$
(11)
where $||S||$ denotes the number of elements of a subset $S$ . Player $\mathrm{i}$
following the motive $m_{3}$ makes self-sacrifices for the sake of the group $S$ .
The motive $m_{1}(m_{2})$ is equivalent to the case of $S=\{\mathrm{i}\}(S=N)$ in the
motive $m_{3}$ .
$m_{4}$ : minimization of the expected payoff in the group $S(\subseteq N)$
$a_{i}^{4}$
$(j_{1},.. .,j_{2},)=- \frac{1}{||S||}\sum_{j\in S}a_{\mathit{1}}(j_{1}$ , . . . , $j_{n})arrow \mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}j_{t}$ (12)
This is the case that player $\mathrm{i}$ is opposed to the group $S$ .
$m_{5}$ : maximization of the difference between the payoff of the group $S_{1}$ and
one of the group $S_{2}$ $(S_{1}\cap S_{2}=\phi)$
$a_{i}^{5}$ ( $j_{1}$ , ..., $j_{n})= \sum_{j\in S_{1}}a_{J}(j_{1},\ldots,$ $j_{n})- \sum_{j\in S_{t}}a_{j}(j_{1},\ldots$ , $j_{n}) arrow\max_{i_{i}}$ (13)
The case of $n\mathrm{t}$ , $\ldots$ , $m_{4}$ are equivalent to special cases of the motive $m_{5}$ .
$m_{6}$ : maximization of the minimum payoff in the group $S$
$a_{\mathrm{i}}^{6}$ ( $j_{1},\ldots$ , $j_{n})= \min_{j\in S}a_{j}(j_{1},\ldots,$ $j_{n}) arrow\max_{i_{i}}$ (14)
The player following the motive $m_{6}$ comes to the aid of the least fortunate
member of society $S$ .
$m_{7}$ : maximization of a probabrility that player $\mathrm{i}(\in S)$ takes the maximum
payoff in a group $S$
$a_{\mathrm{i}}^{7}$ $(j_{1},\ldots, j_{n})=\{$
1 if $a_{i}(\dot{n},\ldots,i_{n})=\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}a_{j}(j_{1},\ldots,j_{n})j\in S$
0 otherwise
(15)
When player 1, ... , $n$ follow motives $s_{1},\ldots$ , $s_{n}(\in M)$ respectively, we represent this
game by $G(s_{1},\ldots, s_{n})$ , that is ,
$G(s_{1},\ldots,s_{n})=[a_{i}^{s_{1}}(j_{1},\ldots,j_{n})(\mathrm{i}=\mathrm{L}\ldots,n)|s_{k}\in M,j_{k}\in T_{k}(k=1,\ldots,n)]$ . (16)
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Let $\tilde{x}(s_{1},\ldots, s_{n})$ be aSEP of the game $G(s_{1},\ldots, s_{n})$ , that is,
$\tilde{x}(s_{1},\ldots, s_{n})=\{\overline{x}_{1}(s_{1},\ldots,s_{n}),\ldots,\tilde{x}_{n}(s_{1},\ldots,s_{n})\}$ (17)
where $\tilde{x_{i}}$ $(s_{1},\ldots, s_{n})$ is the stable equilibrium strategy (SES) of player $\mathrm{i}$ . Let




where the symbol $\cup$ denotes the union over all combinations ofmotives of all
$(s_{1}\ldots,s_{n})$
players. Enumerating all elements of the set $E$ , we put
$E=\{x^{\mathrm{J}},\ldots$ , $x’\}$ (19)
where $r$ is the number of elements of the set $E$ .
We consider a certain player $P(\in N)$ . Let $\lambda^{f}=\{\lambda_{1}^{i}$ , . . ., $\lambda_{l}^{i}\rangle$ be the motive
distribution ofplayer $\mathrm{i}$ which player $P$ anticipates $\gamma$ where $\lambda_{k}^{i}$ is a probability that






$M(k)=\{(s_{1},\ldots, s_{n})\in M^{n}|\tilde{x}(s_{1},\ldots, s,,)=x^{k}\}$ . (21)
That is to say , $\alpha^{P}(x^{k})$ is a realization probability of the SEP $x^{k}$ for player $P$ . Then
it is desirable that player $P$ selects a strategy indicated by the SEP having the
maximum realization probability , that is , if
$\alpha^{P}(x^{*})=\max_{x^{k}(\in M)}\alpha^{P}(x^{k})$ (22)
then player $P$ should aim at the SEP $\mathrm{x}^{*}$ .
4. Discussion
In order to explain the variety of strategy selected by a player we have considered the
subjective feeling of a player for a conflict situation. We represent uncertainties about
motives of other players for a strategy selection by motive distributions. We calculate a
payoff of each player under his motive , formulate a new noncooperative game and
obtain its stable equilibrium points (SEP) by carrying out the conflict analysis, Using
the motive distributions of all players we calculate the realization probability of each
SEP We propose that a player should follow a strategy indicated by the SEP having the
maximum realization probability. We can explain the diversity in strategy selection and
distinguish SEPs each other considerably,
We have proposed another method to take into consideration subjective feelings of
players. Namely we formulate a subjective game by motive distributions and follow its
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